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INDIANA'S NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE SURGERY:
A JURISDICTIONAL TRANSPLANT
BACKGROUND FOR JURISDICTIONAL EXPANSION

In the last decade there has been a pervasive trend toward expanding
the in personam jurisdiction of state courts over the nonresident corporation or individual. Stimulating this expansion has been a series of
Supreme Court decisions which has articulated new criteria for determining due process limitations on state court jurisdiction.1 The new due
process standard is one of fairness to the defendant, determined by
balancing all interests involved and requiring that the defendant have
certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance
of the suit in that state does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."2
State court jurisdiction may be viewed as limited by two factors:
the statutory authorization of jurisdiction along with judicial interpretation of this authorization, and the constitutional guarantee of due
process.' It is clear that state statutes cannot extend jurisdiction beyond
due process limits; consequently, statutes in the area are cast in terms of
due process limitations as understood at the time the statutes were
enacted.' Thus the relatively "sudden" expansion of the constitutionally
permissible area of state court in personam jurisdiction has resulted in a
jurisdictional gap-a void between the area where jurisdiction is actually
conferred by existing state statutes and the boundary which could constitutionally be drawn under the limits of due process. In response to this
void many states have enacted "long arm" or "single act" statutes which
1. Hanson v. Denclla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) ; McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,

355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945);

Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction
of State Courts, 25 U. CmI. L. REv. 569 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Kurland].
2. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Developments in
the Lau-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 924 (1960) [hereinafter cited
as Developments]. Because the new standard is based on a balancing of the interests
involved, which will vary with each case, it can be very flexible. That a new standard
as intended is reinforced by the Supreme Court's disregard of the narrower concepts
of consent, presence, and doing business upon which jurisdiction over corporations had
previously been based and which could have been used in the InternationalShoe situation.
These earlier bases were criticized for -being quantitative and mechanical, whereas the
Court wished to promulgate a test that was qualitative.
3. See Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193, 194 (1st Cir. 1948) ; F.
JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.12 (1965) ; Developments, supra note 2, at 912.
4. Examples of this are IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-808 (Burns 1967 Repl.) and IND.
ANN. STAT. § 2-1062 (Bums 1967 Repl.) which, when construed together, require
personal service within the state to obtain in personam jurisdiction.
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to varying degrees provide for jurisdiction over nonresidents.' In addition, the approval of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure
Act' by the American Bar Association7 and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws' portends wide acceptance of
such statutes.'
5.

E.g., A.A.

CODE

tit. 7, § 199(1)

(Supp. 1965); ARiz. R. Civ. F. 4(e) (2)

(Supp. 1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-2502 (Supp. 1967); CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. §
33-422(c) (1962); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 47.16 (Supp. 1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-113-116
(Supp. 1967) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-514 (Supp. 1967) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17
(Smith-Hurd 1956) ; IowA CODE ANN. § 617.3 (Supp. 1966) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
60-308(6) (1964); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.3201 (Supp. 1966); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 704 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, § 96 (1965); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§
27A.701-27A.735 (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13 (Supp. 1966); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.63, 355.375 (1966) ; MONT. R. Crv. P. 4B (1967 Supp.) ; NEv. RKv. STAT. § 14.080
(1961); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-2-16 (Supp. 1967); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302
(McKinney Supp. 1967) ; N.C. GEr. STAT. § 55-145 (1965) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 187 (Supp. 1967); ORE. REv. STAT. § 14.035 (Supp. 1965); R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN.
§ 9-5-33 (Supp. 1966) ; S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-424 (Supp. 1966) ; TEx. REv. Crv. STAT.
ANN. art. 2031b (1964) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 8-81.2 (Supp. 1966) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 855 (1965) ; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.28.185 (1962) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-1-71
(1966) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1967).
6. § 1.03, 9B UNIFORMi LAWS ANNOTATED 310 (1966).
7. Proceedings of the 1963 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 49
A.B.A.J. 385, 393 (1963).

8.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE

LAws

HAND-

BOOK 106, 131 (1962).
9. A unique decision with a different answer to the problem was written by Judge
Dalton in St. Clair v. Righter, 250 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Va. 1966). The case involved a
libel action in which the defendant had mailed libelous statements into Virginia and the
plaintiff was attempting to assert jurisdiction over him under the Virginia long arm
statute. After concluding the Virginia statute would not cover the situation, Judge
Dalton upheld jurisdiction by arguing that jurisdiction was a question of power,
limited by due process, that a long arm statute was "merely legislative approval for the
exercise by the courts of that state of their inherent jurisdictional power at least to the
limits set out in the statute," (Id. at 152) (his emphasis) and that where the state
legislature had not expressly limited state court jurisdiction, the courts were not
restrained from extending their jurisdiction to the limits of due process "even if such an
assumption of latent power is not expressly authorized by the statute." (Id.) Judge
Dalton concluded that due process limits would not be violated, although jurisdiction in
this instance exceeded the statutory authorization.
Judge Dalton based his argument on two premises; (1) "jurisdiction is a question
of power, ultimately defined by due process and not state legislation," (Id.) and (2)
this power is inherent in a court and, in the absence of express legislative limitation,
may be exercised by a court. Neither premise is supported by authority, and the
conclusion that a court can go beyond the statutory authorization seems questionable.
Jurisdiction in the positive sense of legislative authorization is not defined by due
process, but only delimited by the concept. While it can be argued that by specifying
the areas of non-jurisdiction, the area of jurisdiction is defined, the argument that this
power is inherent in a court (whatever is meant by the phrase) must still be accepted.
If this reasoning were followed, it would make a mockery of state statutes, and it is
doubtful that many states will accept it (note that the decision was in a federal district
court). In addition, it would appear there is a negative implication in the Virginia
statute itself to the effect that where the legislature did not authorize jurisdiction they
did not want it exercised, particularly since they presumably were aware other statutes
went farther.
On the basis of the caveat Judge Dalton expressed-that the court did not express
an opinion where there were express legislative limits on jurisdiction, it seems certain
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The universal purpose of long arm statutes is to expand in personam
jurisdiction of state courts, but the wording and the interpretation of
these enactments have varied greatly. While not all the statutes go as far
as due process would allow,' ° the decision not to occupy the total area
is possibly attributable more to uncertainty over what the due process
limitations are than to a desire to leave an area uncovered." Although
the Supreme Court has not expressly ruled on the constitutionality of
long arm statutes, general approval of them seems certain on the basis of
Rosenblatt v. American Cyanimid Co., 2 the views of commentators,"
and the large number of cases in which jurisdiction has been upheld
under the authority of such statutes.'"
While long arm statutes are proliferating, Indiana has refrained from
enacting such a statute. This omission raises the question of whether
Indiana needs a long arm statute or whether existing statutes provide
sufficient coverage for the protection of state interests.
JURISDICTIONAL COVERAGE OF LONG ARm STATUTES

Long arm statutes are usually subdivided in the same manner: first,
a general provision indicating who is subject to service and, second, a
listing of the conduct which will subject a nonresident to jurisdiction.
Such conduct typically falls into four areas: transaction of business
within the state, commission of a tortious act within the state, owning
real estate within the state, and insuring property within the state.
that Indiana courts would not uphold jurisdiction on his reasoning. IND. CONST. art. 7,
4 states, in effect, that Indiana courts have only such original jurisdiction as the
legislature may confer. Danker v. State, 236 Ind. 696, 138 N.E.2d 900 (1956);
Spence v. State, 221 Ind. 474, 48 N.E.2d 459 (1943).
10. Examples of statutes which do not go as far as due process apparently allows

§

are N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302 (McKinney Supp. 1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-81.2
(Supp. 1964). Under these statutes the provisions with respect to jurisdiction for
tortious acts out of state causing injury within the state are not as broad as that of
Illinois as construed in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22
Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) or that of Minnesota as applied in Ehlers v. U.S.
Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824 (1963).
11. Much of this doubt is due to the restrictive holding of Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958), following the prior expansive decision in McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), as indicated in the 1965 Practice Commentary by
McLaughlin to the N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LA.w § 302 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
12. 86 S. Ct. 1 (1965) (discussed in text accompanying footnote 84). The case
involved the provision of the New York long arm statute conferring jurisdiction for the
commission of a tortious act within the state.
13. E.g., Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 569 [hereinafter cited as Currie] ; Developments, supranote 2.
14. E.g., Liquid Carriers Corp. v. American Marine Corp., 375 F.2d 951 (2d Cir.
1967); Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1965);
Anderson v. Penncraft Tool Co., 200 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Ill. 1961); and see Note, The
Virginia "Long Arm" Statute, 51 VA. L. REv. 719 (1965) for an excellent presentation
of Virginia's long arm statute, what it attempts to cover, and some problems it raises.
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Jurisdiction under these classifications is always limited by the highly
flexible test of fairness, as represented by minimum contacts. In addition,
there is often a special provision for service of process in an action
arising under the statute.
For purposes of discussion, the Illinois act will be used as a representative long arm statute, and references will be mainly to the Illinois
and New York provisions." The Illinois act was the first such comprehensive statute and has been copied by a number of states. It has,
however, been interpreted liberally 6 while the New York act, which is
similar in wording, has been construed more conservatively.' 7 The
Illinois act provides:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of
this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the
acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits said person, and,
if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from
the doing of said acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within this State;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate
situated in this State;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk
located within this State at the time of contracting.
The transactionof any business within the state
The transaction of business within the state as a basis of jurisdiction is duplicated almost verbatim in the New York act, and similar
phrasing is present in most long arm statutes."8 The question is how
15. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956); N.Y. Civ. P Ac. LAW §
302 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
16. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961).
17. Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443,
261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 209 N.E.2d 68 (1965).
18. Among variations in the phrasing are those represented by the Michigan and
Wisconsin statutes. Michigan's statute, in addition to providing for jurisdiction in a
cause of action arising from the transaction of any business, provides for jurisdiction in
a cause of action arising from "[e]ntering into a contract for services to be performed
or for materials to be furnished in the state by the defendant." MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§
27A.701-27A.735 (1962). Wisconsin provides for jurisdiction in a cause of action which
"arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some third party for the
plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to deliver or receive within this state or to ship
from the state goods, documents of title, or other things of value; .. ." Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 262.05 (Supp. 1967). The detail added by these provisions has been a response to a
feeling that "transaction of business" requires a direct act in the state, while a contract
involving a state resident creates sufficient state interest for jurisdiction. There is also
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far, under this phrasing, jurisdiction can consititutionally be exercised."9
Most of the actions under this provision concern the performance of
contracts involving a nonresident, and the question is whether the nonresident has had sufficient connection with the state to warrant jurisdiction
over him.2" While some state statutes provide for jurisdiction where a
contract is to be performed in whole or in part in the state.2 New York
courts, by saying that the mere shipment of goods into the state is
insufficient, 2 have not extended jurisdiction as far as constitutionally
permissible.2 3 Illinois only recently discarded a requirement that the
defendant be physically present at some point in the transaction;2"
however, where the nonresident was present at some stage, both New
York and Illinois generally uphold jurisdiction." Other factors in
determining whether the defendant has had sufficient contact with the
probably a fear the courts will give an unduly restrictive interpretation to "transacting
any business" and that by such a provision it is made clear that a single act is sufficient
to justify jurisdiction. While the specification may result in less litigation over coverage,
it is apparent these provisions could be covered by a broad interpretation of "transacting
any business." However, a good argument for including a provision covering contracts
to supply services or things in the state is given in Note, The Virginia "Long Arm"
Statute, 51 VA. L. Rav. 719, 733-44 (1965).
19. Because the interpretation of what comes within the statute and what constitutes minimum contact or "fairness" is essentially a subjective one, with the result
depending on the facts of each case, it is difficult to generalize as to when jurisdiction
will be upheld. Another problem of evaluation, due to the interaction of long arm
statutes and the due process limit, is the analytical difficulty of determining whether
the court is indulging in statutory interpretation or is interpreting due process
requirements.
20. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) indicated an
isolated contract may be sufficient, but that case involved an area in which the state had
a special interest (life insurance). However, the Court in that instance balanced the
interests of the plaintiff, the state, and the defendant; presumably, the state's interest was
only one factor considered.
21.

MINe. STAT. ANx. § 303.13 (Supp. 1966).

22. Kramer v. Vogl, 17 N.Y.2d 27, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900, 215 N.E.2d 259 (1966).
The defendant was a nonresident who had sold and sent goods into New York pursuant
to orders from within the state. The defendant had conducted no advertising or
promotional activities within the state and while the defendant's sales into New York
totaled 125,000 dollars annually, they were only one to two percent of the defendant's
total volume. The court held the contact insufficient to be considered transacting business.
23. Ehlers v. U.S. Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824
(1963).
24. Ziegler v. Houghton-Mifflin Co., 80 Ill. App. 2d 210, 224 N.E.2d 12 (1967);
Koplin v. Thomas, Haab & Botts, 73 Ill. App. 2d 242, 219 N.E.2d 646 (1966). The
absolute requirement of such an element illustrates a danger that the minimum contact
test will be made into a quantitative, mechanical test, instead of the flexible, qualitative
determination of fairness suggested by InternationalShoe. There is also a danger that a
court will apply old "doing business" criteria, while "transacting any business" is a new
test requiring less contact. This appears to be what happened in Grobark v. Addo
Machine Co. 16 Ill. 2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959).
25. National Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 270 F.2d (7th Cir. 1959);
Kropp Forge Co. v. Jawitz, 37 Ill. App. 2d 475, 186 N.E2d 76 (1962); LonginesWittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 209
N.E.2d 68 (1965).
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state to warrant jurisdiction include the place where the agreement was
negotiated" or signed,2" the presence of advertising," and the volume
of business in the state.29
The commission of a tortiousact within the state
Conflicting interpretations as to coverage have been given to this
provision. It is certain that the provision includes torts conunited by the
nonresident defendant or his agent while physically present in the
state,"0 but it is not clear whether it includes negligent acts outside the
state causing injury within-the typical products liability situation.
Illinois has interpreted the phrasing to include the out of state act, 1
while the New York courts (prior to a statutory amendment) held it
did not. 2 Some states have avoided the issue by saying "a tort in whole
or in part," which clearly covers both interpretations."3 It is clear that in
tort actions courts have required less than in contract actions in terms of
the defendant's relation to the forum state to sustain jurisdiction, but it is
uncertain how much less. 4 Partially due to this uncertainty, the current
26. Liquid Carriers Corp. v. American Marine Corp., 375 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1967).
27. United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1966); Haas v.
Fancher Furniture Co., 156 F. Supp 564 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
28. Pallas v. Driv-Rite, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 582 (N.D.N.Y. 1966).
29. McKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1965). It is evident that no
fixed series of factors can be listed as sufficient contact in contract actions. The degree
of contact required varies with the equities of the situation. Thus, where the defendant
and plaintiff are both in the state when the contract is executed, this may be sufficient
contact, but if the defendant is out of state, the questions of who initiated the transaction
and where acceptance took place become important. For example, a high degree of contact
may be required when the plaintiff goes out of state to initiate or execute the contract.
See Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956);
Morgan v. Heckle, 171 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Ill. 1959) ; Currie, supra note 13, at 577.
30. Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Co., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951),
cited favorably in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957), in
which the nonresident defendant was physically present in the state when the negligent
act was committed.
31. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961). In product liability cases involving injury to the consumer, the
fairness test, as applied in some states, has become a question of whether it was
reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer that his product would enter the forum state.
See Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966);
Metal-Matic, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Circuit Court, 415 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1966).
32. Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443,
261 N.Y.S.2d 8,209 N.E.2d 68 (1965).
33.

MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13 (Supp. 1966).

34. While the decision in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), could be interpreted as indicating the mere
occurrence of the injury is sufficient contact, the court in that case presumed from the
nature of the defendant's business that the defendant derived substantial commercial
benefit from Illinois purchasers. Minnesota courts are perhaps the most liberal on this
score. Jurisdiction was upheld in Ehlers v. U.S. Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267
Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824 (1963), where the defendant manufacturer of the defective
product had sold the product to an Ohio company which had in turn sold it to an
Illinois distributor who sold it to a Minnesota retailer. The manufacturer had no

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
New York statute and the Uniform Act take the cautious approach of
enacting statutory requirements of the degree of contact a nonresident
defendant must have with the state before it can exercise jurisdiction
over him for a negligent act outside the state causing injury within."5
These statutory requirements are equivalent to a state definition of due
process limits, but one which is well within the Supreme Court standard.
The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in the state
This provision is common in long arm statutes,"0 and is a natural
outgrowth of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington." The support for
such jurisdiction comes from two sources: the strong state interest in
land within the state, and the balancing of interests process put forth in
International Shoe. The reasoning is that the continuing status of
owning, possessing, or using land in a state represents a more significant
contact than a single act, and that nonresidents falling into these categories are continuously receiving benefits from the protective laws and
facilities of the state, while the situs of the land evidences voluntary
contact with the state."
There has been relatively little litigation under this provision,3
and many causes of action which could be encompassed by it are also
contacts with Minnesota. In sustaining jurisdiction, the court said the product was mass
produced for nationwide use and it was a reasonable inference it would be used in
Minnesota.
The problem the courts have in the area stems from Judge Sobeloff's example in
Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956) of a
Pennsylvania resident who purchased a defective tire from a California retailer which
caused an injury in Pennsylvania. Where the seller's scope of business is so local in
nature, it is manifestly unjust to require him to go to a distant forum. But note that
Currie does not think jurisdiction even in this extreme case would necessarily be unfair.
Currie, supra note 13, at 557.
35. The Uniform Act provides for jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant for
"causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside the state if he
regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct,
or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in
this state; . . ." UNirORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE AcT, § 1.03, 9B
UNIFORMt LAw ANNOTATED 310 (1966).
The New York act excepts defamation from
the tortious acts, and adds to the preceding Uniform Act provision: "expects or reasonably should expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial
revenue from interstate or international commerce." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302 (McKinney Supp. 1967). In effect, these statutes are enacting express definitions of what
constitutes the implicit limitation of "minimum contacts," but which are more conservative
than some current applications.
36. E.g., the provision is reproduced in the New York statute and the UNIFORM
INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE AcT with very little variation.
37. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
38. See Note, Ownership, Possession, or Use of Property as a Basis of In Personamit
Jurisdiction,44 IowA L. REv. 374 (1959) for a discussion of the provision.
39. In Illinois and New York there have been only three reported cases dealing
with the provision. Levin v. Ruby Trading Corp., 248 F. Supp. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
People v. Streeper, 12 Ill. 2d 204, 145 N.E.2d 625 (1957); Porter v. Nahas, 35 III.
App. 2d 360, 182 N.E.2d 915 (1962).
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included within the phrase "transaction of business."4 While the provision is not without problems, 4' the word "use" is indefinite enough to
give a court flexibility in handling many situations. The value of the
provision is demonstrated in cases such as Porter v. Nahas4 2 in which
it was used to acquire jurisdiction over former tenants, who had left the
state, in an action to recover damages from use of the property in
violation of a lease. The court pointed out that while the tenants had
lived in Illinois they had received the benefit and protection of Illinois'
laws."3
INDIANA'S PRESENT JURISDICTION

Comparison of the approach embodied in a long arm statute with
the Indiana system is difficult since Indiana determines its jurisdiction
by its provisions for service of process. Indiana process statutes, and
consequently Indiana's jurisdiction are based on the type and location
of the defendant instead of the nature of the action. This is a logical
emphasis for statutes dealing with process, but it has resulted in narrowly
defined coverage and an unwieldy diffusion of jurisdictional statutes.
A better approach would be to recognize that jurisdiction and service of
process are different concepts with different due process requirements.
Jurisdiction deals with the appropriate geographic area for the action and
some connection of the defendant with that area, while service of process
deals with the giving of adequate and timely notice for the defense of
the action. 4
40. E.g., the corporation or individual who owns or uses property within a state
often does so as an incident of doing business within that state.
41. The Commissioners' notes to the UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL
PROCEDURE AcT, § 1.03, 9B UNIrFoR LAWS ANNOTATED 310, 313 point out that while:
• . . the Michigan and Wisconsin statutes (MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27A.705,
27A.715, 27A.725, 27A.735 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 262.05 (6))
include the ownership, use or possession of personal property as a basis of
jurisdiction, this basis has been excluded because of the difficulties that might
be posed in situations such as those involving stolen property, conditional
sales and chattel mortgages.
Note, however, that this is related to personal property.
42. 35 I1. App. 2d 360, 182 N.E.2d 915 (1962).
43. Discussion of provision (d) will be deferred until the comparable Indiana
statute is evaluated.
44. The logical distinction was recognized and used as an analytical base by the
Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950). Dcvelopncnts, supra note 2, at 987-88 states:
[flurther, notice and jurisdiction seemed to be two aspects of the same
thing in early American law, since the act of service of process provided
evidence of the defendant's presence in the state as well as notified him of
the proceedings. However, statements in the early cases that service was
limited to the territorial confines of the state may now be seen to have
referred to the limited basis of jurisdiction rather thqn to a restriction arising
from limits on methods and extent of notice.
Indiana, however, still identifies the two concepts.
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Indiands JurisdictionOver Foreign Corporations
Much of the litigation involving foreign defendants stems from
commercial situations and involves corporations. This is a logical result
of expanding interstate business and the tendency of sole proprietorships
and partnerships to conduct a localized business, or, if doing business on
a larger scale, to incorporate to gain the benefits of this form of organization. Thus it could be argued that Indiana's "doing business" or
"qualification" statutes, under which it attempts to exercise in personam
jurisdiction over foreign corporate defendants, are sufficient protection
for Indiana residents since there are relatively few cases involving
individual defendants.
Indiana has two key qualification statutes. 5 Section 25-301"
provides that before any foreign corporation organized for profit may
transact business in the state it must obtain a certificate of admission
from the secretary of state. The requirements for the granting of a
certificate include appointing a resident agent for service of process in
actions against the foreign corporation. 7 There is no requirement for
jurisdiction under section 25-301 that the cause of action arise out of the
transaction of business, and once the agent is appointed jurisdiction
is assured for any action. The penalty for noncompliance with section
25-301 is a denial of the right to maintain any suit in the courts of the
state and a monetary fine.4"
45. The main statutes are IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-301 (Burns 1960 Repl.) and
STAT. § 25-316 (Burns 1960 Repl.) which apply to foreign corporations
generally, but Indiana also has a series of qualification statutes applying to more
specialized corporate defendants: IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-2327 (Bums 1964 Repl.)
(nonresident banks); IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-870 (Burns Supp. 1967) (nonresident
seller of securities); IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-5503 (Burns 1965 Repl.) (unauthorized
foreign insurer); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1237 (Burns 1965 Repl.) (nonresident common
carrier and contract carrier); IND. ANN. STAT. § 42-1803 (Burns 1965 Repl.) (nonresident operating collection agency); IND. ANN. STAT. § 55-4102 (Burns 1951 Repl.)
(foreign express companies). Another statute under which in personam jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation could be attained is IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-703 (Burns 1967
Repl.), (foreign express companies). Another statute under which in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation could be attained is IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-703
(Burns 1967 Repl.) but any situation falling under it would also come under section
25-316. In addition, in a narrow range of situations an Indiana buyer (wholesaler,
retailer) could put a "string" on a nonresident seller under the "vouching in" provision
of IND. ANN. STAT. § 19-2-607 (Burns 1964 Repl.). Thus if an Indiana buyer was sued
by a consumer who purchased from him for breach of warranty, the Indiana buyer
could, by giving his seller the proper notice, bind the defendant seller on the determination. A subsequent action by the buyer on the Indiana judgment in the defendant's
forum would be pro forma. Also, see Note, Foreign Corporations: The Interrelation
of JTurisdictionand Qualification,33 IND. L.J. 358 (1958).
46. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-301 (Bums 1960 Repl.) [hereinafter all textual section
references will be to Burns IND. ANN. STAT.].
47. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 25-304 to 25-306 (Burns Supp. 1967).
48. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-314 (Bums 1960 Repl.).
IND. ANN.
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The second statute, section 25-316 ,4 provides for substituted service on the Secretary of State for any cause of action arising from
"iany act or thing" done by a foreign corporation which has engaged
"in any transaction or the doing of any business in this state" when not
licensed or admitted to do business in the state. Thus even though a
corporation had not complied with section 25-301, it could still be
amenable to service of process under section 25-316. However, although
section 25-316 has not been construed by state courts, it appears that less
activity in Indiana by the foreign corporation is required for the corporation to be subject to Indiana process than is required before the
corporation must qualify as "transacting business."5 Thus section 25316 would provide a broader initial jurisdiction than would section
25-301, and section 25-301 is of little moment for purposes of expanded
jurisdiction."'
In terms of coverage, a question remains as to what is included
under "transacting business" or under "any transaction or the doing of
any business." 2 In analyzing the opinions which have construed the
phrase "transacting business" a distinction has been made between
actions arising under the qualification statute, section 25-301 (which
deals with the commerce clause as a limit), and those determining
whether the corporation is subject to service of process, in which case
the due process clause is the limiting factor. " In addition, many of the
cases arising under section 25-301 involve the resident defendant who
attempts to avoid liability by arguing the nonresident plaintiff was
transacting business in Indiana, had not complied with section 25-301,
49. IND.

ANN. STAT.

§ 25-316 (Burns 1960 Repl.).

50. This conclusion is supported by 1929-30 Op. A7T'Y

GEN.

IND.

136 which

suggests that despite the similar wording of sections 25-301 and 25-316, the requirements
of section 25-316 for service of process are not the same as section 25-301 for qualification. See also Kokomo Opalescent Glass Co. v. A. W. Schmid Int'l, Inc., 371 F.2d 208
(7th Cir. 1966); Green v. Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co., 204 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.
Ind. 1962).
51. Note, Foreign Corporations: The Interelation of Jurisdiction and Qualification, 33 IND. L.J. 358, 370 (1958) observes that doing business for qualification
purposes often requires a higher quantum of activity than when the same phrase is
used to acquire jurisdiction over non-complying corporations. The Note also observes
that the state acquires a greater extent of jurisdiction over a corporation which complies
with the qualification statute than over one which does not. Id. 369.
52. It must be noted that while the statutes use the quoted phrases, they are
generally referred to as " doing business" statutes, and that the courts discuss the
statutes' application in terms of doing 'business, making no distinction between the
different phrases.
53. This distinction was noted in Green v. Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co., 204
F. Supp. 117, 132 (S.D. Ind. 1962), the leading case in the area. The court observed
that subjecting a foreign corporation to qualification under section 25-301 may constitute a burden on interstate commerce, whereas the interstate commerce may create
sufficient "minimum contacts" to permit service of process, which is not a burden on
interstate commerce. On pages 130-31 of the opinion there is an excellent footnote
presenting Indiana cases relating to foreign corporations "transacting business."
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was subject to the penalty provision, and was, therefore, unable to bring
suit. 4 Thus a requirement of extensive contact before the corporation
is considered to be transacting business has resulted from the combination of the case posture which results in the court's traditionally
narrow construction of penalty provisions influencing the interpretation
of "transacting business," and the additional factor of encouraging or
discouraging business.55
Section 25-316 is thus left as the major statute relevant to service
of process, but it has never been construed by Indiana courts." The
leading decision construing the statute is Green v. Robertshaw-Fulton
Controls Co., 7 in which the plaintiff was suing for personal injuries
resulting from a defective product manufactured by a nonresident defendant. Although all orders were approved out of state and all shipments
54. Gross Income Tax Div. v. Surface Combustion Corp., 232 Ind. 100, 111 N.E.2d
50 (1953); Mutual Mfg. Co. v. Alpaugh, 174 Ind. 381, 91 N.E. 504 (1910); Wilson v.
Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 164 Ind. 462, 73 N.E. 892 (1905); Dodgem Corp. v. D. D.
Murphy Shows, Inc., 96 Ind. App. 325, 185 N.E. 169 (1933); North Dakota Realty &
Inv. Co. v. Abel, 85 Ind. App. 563, 155 N.E. 46 (1927) ; Hollowell v. Smith Argicultural
Chem. Co., 41 Ind. App. 361, 83 N.E. 772 (1908). More than a single contact is
required to come under section 25-301. It was stated in Alpaugh and later in Lowenmyer v. National Lumber Co., 71 Ind. App. 458, 125 N.E. 67 (1919) that a single contact
or isolated business act was not transacting 'business because section 25-301 was only
intended to apply to corporations which established permanent agencies in the state. In
cases where the foreign corporation was held to fall under the statute there was
substantial contact, usually over a considerable period of time. Gross Income Tax
Div. v. Fort Pitt Bridge Works, 227 Ind. 538, 86 N.E.2d 685 (1949); Burroughs v.
Southern Colonization Co., 96 Ind. App. 93, 173 N.E.716 (1930) ; United States
Const. Co. v. Hamilton Nat. Bank, 73 Ind. App. 149, 126 N.E. 866 (1920); Lowenmyer v. National Lumber Co., 71 Ind. App. 458, 125 N.E. 67 (1919). The distinction of
transacting 'business for purposes of qualification from that for service of process was
also noted in 1929-30 OrP. A'r'y GEN. IND. 136.
55. Peter & Burghard Stone Co. v. Carper, 96 Ind. App. 554, 172 N.E. 319
(1930). The liberality toward the foreign corporation in this situation is further
exemplified by holdings that failure to qualify only renders a contract sued upon
voidable, and that the foreign corporation could sue upon the contract after subsequent
compliance. Farmers Mut. Hail Ins. Co. v. Gorsuch, 123 Ind. App. 264, 110 N.E.2d
344 (1953) ; Warren Co. v. Exodus, 114 Ind. App. 651, 54 N.E.2d 775 (1944).
56. Section 25-316 has been construed by the attorney general in determining
amenability of foreign real estate corporations, not licensed as real estate brokers in
Indiana and not admitted to do business in Indiana, but which occasionally sent
agents into Indiana to obtain listings of Indiana property, to service of process for the
purpose of enjoining such activity. 1957 Op. ATT'Y GEN. InD. 96. The attorney general
concluded this was doing business in Indiana, under the terms of section 25-316. This
is not general authority for a single act falling under Indiana's definition of doing
business, however, as the attorney general based his conclusion on section 9 of the Real
Estate License Law which provided that a single act would require a real estate license.
Only on the basis of that statute was the single act equivalent to doing business. In
addition, in the case with which the attorney general dealt, the agent was physically
present in Indiana. It is interesting to note that the attorney general made no mention
of the International Shoe test and referred to section 25-316 as a "doing business
statute." The opinion should therefore be regarded as an "exception" to Indiana's
usual approach to qualification statutes.
57. 204 F. Supp. 117 (S. D. Ind. 1962).
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were f.o.b. Chicago, the defendant did a large volume of business in
Indiana and had several sales representatives in the state. The defendant
argued that merely having sales representatives in Indiana soliciting
orders did not make it subject to process under section 25-316.
The central problem was interpreting the phrase "any transaction
or the doing of any business," on which both tort and contract actions
must be based. The defendant relied on criteria established in Mutual
ilfg. Co. v. Alpaugh, s which the Green court rejected as relating to the
penalty provision and not turning on the question of the extent to which
Indiana would subject a foreign corporation to service of process. The
plaintiff phrased his arguments in terms of the standard set forth in
InternationalShoe, but the court relied heavily on an 1898 case, Rush. v.
Foos M/1fg. Co.," which it interpreted as indicating that solicitation of
business in Indiana was sufficient transaction of business to allow service
of process for in personam jurisdiction. Reliance was also placed on an
unreported case discussed in Rush which held that service of process in
Indiana upon a traveling salesman of a foreign corporation was sufficient
to acquire personal jurisdiction in an action for personal injuries."
From these and other sources6 the court concluded that Indiana
had not adopted a narrow interpretation of "doing business" in determining the amenability of a foreign corporation to service of process.62
The court stated that, although the statute did not go as far as the
"single tort" theory of jurisdiction of other states, the statutory language "engaging in any transaction or the doing of any business in the
Indiana statute is as broad as constitutional authority will permit."6 3
In addition to the physical presence of the agents, the court emphasized
the systematic and continuous activities of the defendant in Indiana, and
the large volume of business in the course of which the defendant
received the benefit and protection of Indiana law.
58. 174 Ind. 381, 91 N.E. 504 (1910). The case had said, with respect to the
applicability of the qualification statute, that a foreign corporation was "transacting
business" when it had established permanent agencies in the state, and that transacting
business did not include the situation in which traveling agents were in the state or
delivery of goods took place outside the state.
59. 20 Ind. App. 515, 51 N.E. 143 (1898). The action was for breach of warranty.
60. Scofield v. Peter Scheonhoffer Brewing Co., mentioned in Ru sh at 20 Ind.
App. 515, 532, 51 N.E. 143, 149 (1898). In Scofield the action was for personal injuries,
and from the facts given it appears to be very similar to Green in that the foreign
corporation apparently sold products in Indiana, the salesmen in Indiana only solicited
orders, and goods were shipped f.o.b. Chicago.
61. These included the court's analysis of Indiana case law, statutes, attorney
general opinions, and Schmidt v. Esquire, Inc., 210 F.2d 908 (7th Cir. 1954).
62. Since we are concerned with finding how broadly Indiana has interpreted its
statute, this conclusion is of little value. In effect, it means only that Indiana does not
require as much contact for service of process as for compliance with the qualification
statute. The question remains of how little contact is required.
63. F. Supp. 117, 137 (S.D. Ind. 1962).
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The phrasing of section 25-316-"any transaction" and "any act
or thing"-with wording in the singular, coupled with the district
court's interpretation of Indiana decisions, could be the basis for arguing
that section 25-316 goes as far as any long arm statute, but the Green
opinion poses several difficulties. First, it is unfortunate that the court
primarily concerned itself with what Indiana considers "doing business,"
which was the question in Rush and other authorities analyzed. Given
the facts presented and the old authority relied upon, the International
Shoe test was unnecessary for the .decision as rendered; however, the
Green court could have applied the new standard of fairness determined
by a balancing of interests by basing their decision on the "any transaction" phrase instead of "doing business." 64
Secondly, while the court emphasized Rush, which upheld service
of process on an officer of a foreign corporation present in the state for
the transaction of business, the reasoning in Rush was that a corporation
could only act through its agents and could be said to be present where
its agents were. Thus both Rush and the unreported decision it discussed
would require the physical presence of an agent of the corporation to
sustain jurisdiction in either a tort or contract action.65 This conclusion
is further supported by Chassis-Trak,Inc. v. FederatedPurchaser,Inc.,"6
in which a federal district court in New Jersey construed section 25-316
as not applying to an action by an Indiana firm against a New York
Corporation for breach of contract. The foreign corporation had initiated
the contract by a phoned order, and all negotiation was by mail and
telephone. The court found a failure to comply with the mechanics of
section 25-316 fatal to the action, but stated that even if there had been
compliance there were insufficient contacts." However, in subsequent
64. If the court had wanted to base its decision on the Intornational Shoe
standard, it could have construed the phrase "any transaction" as the minimal requirement, equating this to the "transaction of any business" in the Illinois and New York
statutes. Then it would have been able to balance the interests involved in determining
if jurisdiction was fair under the circumstances, ignoring Indiana's interpretation of
"doing business." But using the Indiana interpretation, the Green court has left the
question unanswered as to whether future cases will be decided on a qualitative, fairness
basis, or on the previous mechanical quantitative "doing business" concepts.
65. Since the equities of a tort action differ considerably from the contract action,
the requirement seems questionable from that standpoint. In addition, such a rigid
position runs contra to the flexible test propounded by Intenzational Shoe under which
physical presence should only be one factor among others. In today's realm of interstate
business and transportation, where orders are often by mail or phone, the requirement
of physical presence seems ludicrous and dated by the stage of development of business
at the time the decision was rendered.
66. 179 F. Supp. 780 (D.NJ. 1960). The plaintiff Indiana corporation was suing
on a judgment recovered in an Indiana state court. The defendant moved for a summary
judgment upon the ground that the Indiana court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant.
67. The court based its decision on Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills,
Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956) in which a single shipment from the foreign corporation to the resident plaintiff was insufficient contact to support an action for breach of
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cases jurisdiction has been upheld where the foreign corporation's representatives have been present in Indiana."8 In contrast, neither Illinois
nor New York requires physical presence in tort actions, 9 and it is
clear that Illinois (and probably New York) does not require it in
contract actions although they consider it an important factor.7"
A third problem, of course, is that the Indiana district courts
interpretation of Indiana policy and section 25-316 is not authoritative.
The factual situation in Green made it relatively easy to uphold jurisdiction, while in a single contact situation the question would be much
much difficult; thus it remains uncertain how broadly Indiana courts will
construe the statute. Further, assuming jurisdiction were expanded under
section 25-316, this jurisdiction would be under the guise of new definitions for old terms which have already acquired meanings that may act
restrictively on any expansive interpretation. Thus, while section 25-316
may potentially accommodate an expanded jurisdiction over foreign
corporations to the extent possible under a long arm statute, there is little
reason to expect that broad an application. 7'
contract. The case could have been distinguished, however, as in Erlanger the resident
had initiated the transaction by sending its agent to the foreign corporation. In
Chassis-Trak, the foreign corporation initiated the contract and arguably this situation
could require less contact to justify jurisdiction. See Currie, supra note 13, at 55-56.
68. Kokomo Opalescent Glass Co. v. A. W. Schmid Int'L. Inc., 371 F.2d 208
(7th Cir. 1966) ; Electronic Mfg. Corp. v. Trion, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Ind. 1962).
While factors other than physical presence are considered, physical presence seems to be
the element on which the cases are turning. The court in Kokomo emphasized the
physical presence of the defendant for installation of a machine pursuant to a contract of
sale. In Trion, the defendant foreign corporation had taken part in negotiations in
Indiana, claimed a proprietary interest in property in Indiana, and had been buying
goods from the plaintiff Indiana corporation for over four and one-half years. In
contrast to the Green decision, both the instant cases emphasize the Intenational Shoe
minimum contacts test, and focus on "any transaction" as a test apart from doing
business, but until a close factual situation is presented it is uncertain how far the
Indiana federal courts will expand jurisdiction under section 25-316. In addition, to the
extent Indiana plaintiffs can get into the federal courts on an expanded diversity
jurisdiction under section 25-316, Indiana state courts may not be given the opportunity
to authoritatively construe section 25-316.
69. Ziegler v. Houghton-Mifflin Co., 80 Ill. App. 2d 210, 224 N.E.2d 12 (1967);
N.Y. CnI. PRAc. LAW. § 302 (McKinney Supp. 1967) lists the New York requirements.
70. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Il. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961). New York law on this point is unclear, although it is clear that the
mere shipment of goods into the state, without more, is insufficient. Kramer v. Vogl,
17 N.Y.2d 27, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900, 215 N.E.2d 159 (1966). Singer v. Walker, included
within Longines-Wittnauer W. Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 261
N.Y.S.2d 8, 209 N.E.2d 68 (1965) would seem to indicate physical presence is not
required, but that little more in addition to shipment is required. See Supplementary
Practice Commentary by McLaughlin for 1966 under N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW § 302 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
71. Minnesota's long arm statute (MXNN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13 (Supp. 1966))
exemplifies how far jurisdiction can be extended. It is comparable to section 25-316 in
that it applies only to foreign corporations, but jurisdiction has been upheld over a
manufacturer for tortious injury from a defective product which reached Minnesota via
several intermediaries. Ehlers v. U.S. Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56,
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Indiana'sJurisdictionOver Individuals and Others
Indiana's most glaring jurisdictional void is the absence of any
provision for in personam jurisdiction over nonresident individuals,
partnerships, or unincorporated associations."2 Indiana's rationale for
refusing to extend jurisdiction over nonresident individuals is based on
an old Supreme Court decision" and a narrow interpretation of International Shoe. In Travis v. Fuqua74 the court stated that service of
process under section 2-703 which provides for jurisdiction over the
nonresident individual or company having an office or agency in any
county for the transaction of business for a cause of action arising out of
that business would not be good against a nonresident individual. The
t
basis for this conclusion was Flexnor v. Farson
e in which the United
States Supreme Court construed a Kentucky statute similar to section
2-703 and concluded that service could not be made on the agent of a
non-resident partnership. The Court said the state could not exclude the
individual partners as it could a corporation and, therefore, could not
imply consent to service from the partnership's doing business in Kentucky. The Indiana court ignored a later Supreme Court opinion, Henry
6 which construed a similar statute and
L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman,"
upheld jurisdiction over a nonresident individual who sold securities in
Iowa. The Doherty opinion distinguished Flexnor on the ground that the
one served in Flexnor was not then the agent of the defendants-a basis
not mentioned in Flexnor and so tenuous as to overrule that case."'
124 N.E.2d 824 (1963). The court reasoned the product was made for national consumption and thus it was reasonably foreseeable it would reach Minnesota. Such an
approach is a far broader basis on which to exercise jurisdiction than considerations and
arguments in Green indicate Indiana would follow.
72. There are several statutes in special areas which provide for personal
jurisdiction by substituted service on a state official, e.g., the nonresident motorist
(IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1043 (1965)); the nonresident airplane operator (IND. ANN.
STAT. § 14-907 (Burns 1964 Repl.)); and the nonresident seller of securities (IND.

§ 25-870 (Burns Supp. 1967)). In addition, IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-703
(Burns 1967 Repl.) is phrased to include jurisdiction over the nonresident individual or

ANN. STAT.

company having an office or agency in any county for the transaction of business for a
cause of action arising out of that business. Even though section 2-703 is very limited in
scope, doubt has been expressed as to the constitutionality of its application to individuals.
Travis v. Fuqua, 121 Ind. App. 440, 97 N.E.2d 867 (1951) ; Gavit, The New Federal
Riles and Indiana Procedure, 13 IND. L.J. 203 (1938) which states that Flexnor v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919) also casts doubt upon the validity of IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-805
(Burns 1967 Repl.) (service of process on agent of nonresident receiver) and IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ -1307 (Burns 1968 Repl.) (service of process on the agent of a nonresident in an
action for ejectment).
73. Flexnor v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919).

74.
75.
76.
77.

121 Ind. App. 440, 97 N.E.2d 867 (1951).
248 U.S. 289 (1919).
294 U.S. 623 (1935).
Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 388-89, 143 N.E.2d 673, 678-79 (1957). See

Kurland, supra note 1, at 577; Ddvelopments, supra note 2, at 918; Smithers, Virginda's
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The Doherty opinion stressed the state interest in regulating the sale of
securities, and noted that Hess v. Pawloski" had established the power
of a state to regulate the activities of nonresidents within its borders if
the state had a special interest in those activities.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Flexnor was purely conceptual"9
and was based on an implied consent theory which it has now discarded
as a basis of jurisdiction." Thus, as in Doherty, section 2-703 could be
supported by an argument emphasizing the state's special interest in
regulating business activities and protecting residents from abuse by
nonresident individuals."' When the plaintiff in Travis pointed to the
new jurisdictional test of InternationalShoe, however, the Indiana court
distinguished that case as applying only to foreign corporations. This
distinction is unwarranted as that test of due process was set forth without specifically limiting it to corporations, and contained later specific references to natural persons. s2 In addition, the great majority of writers
and the weight of case authority have upheld the test's application to
individuals.83
"Long Arm" Statute: An Argument for Constitutionality of Jurisdiction Over Non-

resident Individuals, 51 VA. L. REv. 712 (1965).
78. 274 U.S. 352 (1937).
79. See Note, Personal Jurisdiction in Minnesota over Absent Defendants, 42
MINN. L. REv. 909, 925 (1958).

80. As noted in Currie, supra note 13, at 561 and Developments, supra note 2,
at 935, the states' jurisdiction over foreign corporations is not based on a power to
exclude as they have jurisdiction over foreign corporations engaged in interstate business
in the state, although they have no power to exclude them. Even before International
Shoe, it was recognized that the real basis for subjecting a foreign corporation to
jurisdiction was reasonableness or fairness. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc. 45 F.2d
139 (2d Cir. 1930).
81. The argument justifying jurisdiction on the basis of the state's special interest
in the activity could result in a very broad jurisdiction, for, as the need arose, the
state's special interest could be shown in many areas. Thus the problem would become
where to draw the line between "special" interests and "ordinary" interests which would
presumably not justify an assumption of jurisdiction.
82. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 319 (1945);
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957). The justifications
given in support of this decision would also apply to an individual as well as to a
corporation.
83. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957). Judge Traynor in
Owens v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 831, 345 P.2d 921,
924-25 (1959) said
[tlhe rationale of the International Shoe case is not limited to foreign corporations, and both its language and the cases sustaining jurisdiction over
nonresident motorists make clear that the minimum contacts test for jurisdiction applies to individuals as well as foreign corporations.
Currie, supra note 13, at 561 states that InternationalShoe made it
. . . clear that the test of personal jurisdiction is fundamental fairness
to the defendant in the light of state interests and trial convenience as
indicated by contacts with the state. There is no earthly reason for limiting
this test to corporations. If it is fair to subject corporations with certain
business contacts with the State to suit there, it is no less so to do the
same with individuals similarly situated.
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While no decision of the Supreme Court has yet explicitly upheld
state court jurisdiction over a nonresident individual doing business
within the state, absent a special regulatory interest, there is little doubt
they would do so if necessary. This conclusion is supported by the trend
of the decisions as exemplified by Justice Goldberg's opinion denying an
application for a stay of judgment in Rosenblatt v. American Cyanimid
Co.84 On the strength of this decision and authority previously mentioned,8" it is clear that Indiana's interpretation of both Flexnor and
InternationalShoe is outmoded, and that a significant jurisdictional void
exists."8
ndiana's JurisdictionBased on Insurance
While Indiana provides for in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction,"
it has nothing comparable to the coverage of the Illinois provision
which creates in personam jurisdiction for a cause of action arising from
the ownership, use, or possession of land situated in the state.8 Thus
this provision covers still another area left untouched by Indiana.
Indiana'sJurisdictionBased on Insurance
Subsection (d) of the Illinois statute provides for jurisdiction in a
cause of action stemming from: "[c]ontracting to insure any person,
property, or risk located within this State at the time of contracting."
See also Developments, supra note 2, at 935 (1960) ; Note, Porsonal Jurisdiction in 1linnesota Over Absent Defendants, 42 MINN. L. REv. 909, 925 (1958).
84. 86 S. Ct. 1 (1965). Goldberg relied heavily on the article by Currie in 1963
U. ILL. L.F. 533. In Rosenblatt the individual defendant had stolen trade secrets in
New York and was served with process under the New York long arm statute. The
defendant applied for a stay of judgment pending an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court
on the basis that personal jurisdiction over him would be unconstitutional. In denying
the application, Mr. Justice Goldberg concluded the constitutional argument was
insubstantial and plenary review by the court was unlikely. Also, see Etzler v. Dille &
McGuire Mfg. Co., 249 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Va. 1965).
85. Supra note 83.
86. Assuming jurisdiction over the nonresident individual is constitutional a
fortiori it would be over partnerships and unincorporated associations. However, to
say that jurisdiction is constitutional does not mean, under the fairness test of International Shoe, jurisdiction will be sustained over a nonresident individual in the same
cases where it would if the defendant were a foreign corporation. The nature of the
parties is a significant factor in balancing the interests involved, and when the defendant
is an individual more may be required in terms of minimum contacts before jurisdiction
is fair.
87. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-708 (Burns 1967 Repl.) and 2-807 (Burns 1967
Repl.) provide a statutory base for quasi in rem actions. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-703
(Burns 1967 Repl.) is somewhat similar to the Illinois provision, but requires that the
cause of action arise out of the transaction of business of an office or agency situated
in the county.
88. The original statute upon which this is based was passed before International
Shoe. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 331 (1953). The Illinois statute was the first similar
provision and is somewhat broader than the original. It is interesting to note that the
provision is directly opposite to Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) as generally
understood.
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Many states have similar provisions as part of their scheme of insurance
regulation. 9 There is little question of the state's power over insurance
companies" and, though it is certain some contact with the state is
required to sustain jurisdiction,9 ' McGee v. InternationalLife Ins. Co.923
indicates how little that contact need be. The relevant Indiana statute
has not yet been construed, and it is difficult to tell how broadly it would
be applied as it contains an omnibus clause. The first section bases
jurisdiction on the issuance or delivery of an insurance contract to a
resident of Indiana or to a corporation authorized to do business in
Indiana.9 4 This coverage is not as broad as that of the Illinois provision
which grants jurisdiction over companies which insure property or a
risk located within the state at the time of contracting. Thus it appears
that Illinois would allow a nonresident individual who has property or
any other insured risk within the state to maintain suit under the
statute while Indiana would not since it predicates service of process on
the issuance or delivery of insurance contracts to residents of the state.
On the other hand, the Illinois act apparently would not extend jurisdiction to a company which insures property out of state owned by a
resident, while the Indiana act would since it does not require that the
object insured be in the state.
Neither Indiana nor Illinois, in accordance with McGee, attaches
significance to where the contract was made or whether agents were
sent into the state. A problem of state interest would be presented in the
event that the insured individual moved out of state unless the object
insured was property or a risk within the state. The Illinois statute
appears to assure state interest by requiring that the object of the
insurance be within the state at the time of contracting, while Indiana
does so by requiring the person receiving the insurance contract to
reside in the state. While the actual coverage of both statutes remains
in doubt, the Illinois statute seems better designed to assure contact by
89. See notes to the
LAWS ANNOTATED 305

UNIFORM

UNAUTHORIZED

INSURER'S

Acr,

9C

UNIFORM

(1957) for a partial listing.

90. 59 Stat. 33, ch. 20. (1945).

91. "That clause [due process] does not contemplate that a state may make
binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." International Shoe Co. v. Washington
326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
92. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
93. IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-5503 (Burns 1965 Repl.).
94. Arguably limiting the use of the statute to resident plaintiffs violates the
privileges and immunities clause by creating a privilege not available to nonresidents
within the jurisdiction. However, the distinction of privileges according to residence
may be based on rational considerations, e.g., preference to residents in access to overcrowded courts both for convenience sake and the fact that they pay for supporting the
court, and to the extent the distinction is reasonable it is not a violation. Douglas v.
New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
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the insuring company with the state and, therefore, to assure the consequent justification of state jurisdiction." The presence of the omnibus
clause in the Indiana statute, however, could allow the extension of
jurisdiction as far as the Illinois statute and Indiana residents may be
well protected.
Serzice of Process Under a Long Arm Statute
Since the person to be served with process under a long arm statute
is a nonresident, many such statutes have special provisions for service
upon the defendant. The Illinois long arm statute"0 provides:
(2) Service of process upon any person who is subject
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, as provided in
this section, may be made by personally serving the summons
upon the defendant outside this state, as provided in this Act,
with the same force and effect as though summons had been
personally served within this State.
As mentioned, Indiana does not separate service of process and the
jurisdictional act, but, rather, determines jurisdiction by whether there is
a provision for service of process. Moreover, Indiana has two statutes
which would have a negative effect on any attempted expansion of in
personam jurisdiction. Section 2-808"7 provides that "[w] hen the defendant is a nonresident, personal service out of the state is equivalent to
publication," and section 2-1062"8 states that "[n]o personal judgment
shall be rendered against a constructively summoned defendant who has
not appeared in the action." The import of these statutes reflects Pennoyer v. Neff,"0 as generally understood, and indicates that personal
jurisdiction may be obtained over the nonresident in two ways: actual
service within the jurisdiction upon him or his authorized agent, or the
less likely means of waiver, general appearance, or consent.' While the
requirement of personal service within the state for in personam jurisdiction may be consistent with Indiana's interpretation of Flexnor v.
Farson, there is little to support it as a logical or legal requirement of
today's notion of due process.'
To have a viable long arm statute,
95. See Currie, supra note 13, at 581-83 for a short discussion of the Illinois
provision and some potential problems.

96. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956).
97.

IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-808 (Burns 1967 Repl.).

98. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1062 (Burns 1967 Repl.).

99. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).

100. Shafe v. Shafe, 101 Ind. App. 200, 198 N.E. 826 (1935).
101. 248 U.S. 289 (1919). The concern over service of process is that it provide
adequate, timely, reasonable notice, which does not depend on the defendant's being
located in the state. The holdings in Hess v. Pawlosld, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) and Henry
L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) made it evident that service within
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Indiana would need to repeal these statutes or to provide a specialized
means for service of process under a long arm statute. 10 2
AN ARGUMENT FOR A LONG ARM STATUTE

The chief argument for a long arm statute centers on the state's
duty to protect its residents. With the fundamental transformation of the
national economy has come a nationalization of commerce resulting in a
great increase in the amount of interstate business and, therefore, an
increase in contacts of residents with nonresidents. In the face of this
growth, the state has an increasing interest in protecting its citizens by
furnishing a convenient forum to protect their rights. If the resident is
forced to sue out of state, he may be faced with a prohibitive expense
which, in effect, would render the nonresident defendant immune from
suit. In addition, many conveniences point to allowing suit in the plaintiff's state-the witnesses and evidence are usually there, the law of the
plaintiff's forum often applies, it is frequently not inconvenient for the
defendant to defend there, and the plaintiff may avoid hostile foreign
courts while retaining the advantage of using his own. At the same
time, modern transportation and communication have made foreign defense much less burdensome."0 3 It should also be noted that residents of
many other states are gaining or have the potential for gaining in
personam jurisdiction over Indiana residents by virtue of their long arm
statutes. Indiana resident plaintiffs are equally entitled to this form of
protection.' 4
the state was not an absolute requirement. See Developments, supra note 2, at 987-91;
Note, Due Process of Law and Notice by Publication, 32 IND. L.J. 469 (1956) ; Note,
PersonalJurisdiction in Minnesota Over Absent Defendants, 42 MINN. L. REv. 909, 923
(1958). Problems created by these statutes were noted in Gavit, The New Federal Rules
and IndianaProcedure,13 IxN. L.J. 203, 209 (1938).
102. Special provisions for service of process in actions arising under long arm
statutes are common. The main requirement is that the notice provisions conform to the
standards set forth in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950). Examples of such provisions include ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 110, § 17 (SmithHurd 1956), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13 (Supp. 1966), N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 308
(McKinney Supp. 1967). The latter is particularly commendable for the flexibility it
provides through a hierarchy of methods in service of process.
103. Many of these points were brought out in McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). See also Developments, supra note 2 at 1015; Note, A
Reconsideration of "Long Arne" Jurisdiction,37 IND. L.J. 333, 335 (1962).
104. This could be regarded as the classic argument for long arm jurisdiction.
Assuming equal justice is rendered by every court, however, it is not certain jurisdiction
is needed in a state to "protect" its residents. However, the decision of a foreign court
is not what the resident is being protected from, but the greater expense of litigating
in the foreign forum. In this respect, it may be desirable to require a plaintiff to post a
bond to cover the defendant's travel expenses and costs, thus eliminating the objection
that residents may file spurious claims in small amounts in the hope the defendant
will pay rather than incur the cost of defending the suit. See Note, PersonalJurisdiction
in Minnesota Over Absent Defendants, 42 MINN. L. Rnv. 909, 928 (1958). Wisconsin in
effect does this by providing that if an action is dismissed due to the defendant's
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Objections can be raised to long arm statutes on a number of
grounds, none of which is very persuasive." 5 It is possible that there
may be reluctance of foreign businesses to transact business in a state,
but with the large and increasing number of such statutes the suggestion
that business would discriminate between locales on this basis is without
merit. Such statutes will naturally add another forum in which the
plaintiff may bring an action and the objection of forum shopping may
arise. However, only one jurisdiction would be added to the large
number already possible, and the convenience of that jurisdiction for the
plaintiff would make it unlikely that he would bring an action elsewhere.
An increase in court business would also logically follow, but other
states have not found this unduly burdensome, and certainly not a basis
for denying their residents protection. In addition, while the plaintiff may
be faced with a two-step litigation process to reduce the judgment to
money, the second step would be largely pro forma.
While a long arm statute is desirable, experience has shown that
drafting a good statute is a highly complex problem. The major difficulty confronting the draftsmen is determining how specific the statute
should be in setting forth the conduct or events giving rise to jurisdiction.
Depending upon how specific the statute is made, the burden of determining its application will be shifted between the legislature and the
judiciary.
The states have taken two approaches in drafting long arm statutes,
with the vast majority typified by broad statements of the nature of the
cause of action as a basis for jurisdiction, such as the Illinois provision.
The nature of the cause of action, however, has little necessary relationship to the central question-whether there are sufficient contacts with
the state to justify jurisdiction in terms of fairness. The second approach
has been to specify in great detail the conduct giving rise to jurisdiction,
irrespective of tort or contract;1' thus the legislature assumes the
initial burden of determining coverage and the courts are left with the
question of whether due process is violated by the statute in each situation. One of the initial problems under this approach is determining what
conduct should or can be specified as giving rise to jurisdiction.
If the purpose of a long arm statute is to protect state residents, it
would seem that a statute with a broad, general authorization would
allow a greater extension of jurisdiction, and thus more protection, than
objection of lack of jurisdiction over his person, the court may order the plaintiff to
pay reasonable expenses of the action up to 500 dollars. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.20

(Supp. 1967).
105. See Note, A Reconsideration of Long Arm Jurisdiction, 37
(1962).
106. Wis.

STAT. ANN.

§ 262.05 (Supp. 1967).

Iln.

L.J. 333
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one in which specific conduct is delineated. Rhode Island has enacted the
broadest possible statute by providing for jurisdiction whenever there are
the requisite minimum contacts." , However, such broad statutory
language may be objectionable for at least two reasons: first, the court
would in effect be required to interpret due process in each case and,
second, a lengthy period of judicial interpretation would be necessary
before the statute acquired definitive meaning. For these reasons, the
better approach would be for the legislature to be more specific as to
what will justify jurisdiction, although a wide range of possibilities is
left." 8 In addition, courts will be less likely to misinterpret or limit a
statute which is specific, although the detail may hamper the adaptability
of the statute.
It must be remembered that despite the single act wording of these
statutes, they are still bound by the flexible test of "fairness" which is
determined by the process of balancing interests." 9 Thus, while the
single contact may exist, jurisdiction may still violate fairness. Further,
the equities of a case can shift radically between corporation v. individual,
corporation v. corporation, and individual v. individual.1 1 A good
example would be the reverse of the McGee situation, with the insurance
company trying to sue the insured individual in the company's home
state and the only contact being the insurance contract. By working with
the "fairness" test, a court can require different degrees of contact in determining if jurisdiction is fair, and the favored position of one such as a
107. "Every foreign corporation, every individual not a resident of this state...,

and every partnership or association, . . ., that shall have the necessary minimum

contacts with the state of Rhode Island, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the state
of Rhode Island .... " R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 9-5-33 (Supp. 1966).
108. While the very act of specification would seem to involve a more limited
coverage than due process would allow, due to the need to fit the action into one of the
specific provisions, specification may be done in such a broad manner it would merely
give the court guidelines for interpretation. The Illinois act is an example of a broad
yet more specific authorization. Perhaps the most specific or detailed long arm statute is
Wis. STAT. ANx. § 262.05 (Supp. 1967).
109. Note that fairness is the constitutional limitation of due process as expressed
through minimum contacts. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
110. Most of the cases arising under the tort provisions of long arm statutes have
been product liability cases in which the defendant is a foreign corporation. The
expanding jurisdiction in this area coincides with the growing interest in consumer
protection, in addition to having the favorable posture for the plaintiff of individual
plaintiff v. corporate defendant. In many of the contract actions both parties are corporations, and while more contact seems to be required under contract actions, a
corporation's ability to defend in a foreign forum more easily than an individual is an
important factor. In actions involving individual defendants, the courts require a high
degree of contact on the part of the nonresident. Most individual businessmen operate in
a very localized area and it could be a severe burden to require them to defend in a
foreign state. See Judge Sobeloff's hypothetical in Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre
Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956), and Currie's discussion in 1963 U. ILL. L.F.
533, 538-79. The localized business was an important factor in the decision in Oliver v.
American Motors Corp., 425 P.2d 647 (Wash. 1967).
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physically injured plaintiff is obvious. It is apparent that many factors
may enter into the determination of "fairness," and relatively minor
aspects can be of importance in a close case.111
A serious question is whether the statute should apply only to
commercial situations, as many statutes presently do. Obviously "transaction of business" fits only the commercial context, but many states
have limited the tort provision by requiring substantial economic contact
with the state before jurisdiction may be exercised." 2 It would seem,
however, that as long as the requisite minimum contacts exist, whether
the tort occurred in a commercial setting should not be conclusive.
A possible third approach which some cases have mentioned should
also be considered in drafting a statute." 8 The concept of minimum
contacts as connoting fairness centers on the relation of the parties and of
the defendant to the prospective forum state. There is little problem in
justifying jurisdiction where there are actual substantial contacts with
the state, but there is a problem in situations such as product liability
where there may be no privity between parties. In this instance the
problem could be handled by drafting, either in terms of or as a limitation
upon a broader provision, a requirement of reasonable foreseeability of
the product's reaching other states. Thus, the single product coming into
a state and causing injury, despite lack of other business contacts, may
justify jurisdiction over a manufacturer if he availed himself of a
national distribution system. By the same reasoning, jurisdiction in a
noncommercial situation may be exercised if the contact with the state
was by direct action of the defendant, which certainly makes consequences within the state reasonably foreseeable. An example is the
defamatory letter mailed from out of state."'
Somewhat related to how specific a long arm statute should be is the
111. The factors could include who initiated the transaction, place of performance,
place of making of a contract, the state's relation to the parties and the subject matter
of litigation, the nature of the parties-individual or corporation, relative economic
positions, locations of witnesses and evidence, nature of remedy sought, and many other
factors which may be of significance in a given factual situation. Thus the determination
of fairness resembles the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in certain
respects. In addition, to prevent unfairness to the defendant, the Illinois courts have
emphasized the use of forum non conveniens and the possibility of removal to a federal
court and then making a motion for removal to a more convenient forum. Nelson v.

Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
112. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 302 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
113. See Ehlers v. U.S. Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d
824 (1963).
114. St. Clair v. Righter, 250 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Va. 1966) presents such a fact

situation. The limitation of the tort provision of the Virginia long arm statute to the
commercial situation was the occasion for Judge Dalton's efforts to sustain jurisdiction.
(See note 9 supra). However, some states, such as New York, except defamation from
the coverage of their long arm statute. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302 (McKinney Supp.

1967).
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necessity of assuring adequate protection to the defendant. Long arm
,statutes are intended to aid the resident plaintiff, but the due process
limitation is in terms of fairness to the defendant and a tension can
result from these opposing considerations. The further jurisdiction is
extended and the more tenuous the defendant's contact with the forum
becomes, the more important it becomes that the defendant be adequately protected. The defendant may try to remove the case to a federal
court and then make a motion for removal to a more convenient forum."'
Another possible protection for the defendant is the doctrine of forum
non conveniens on the state level, and it may be desirable to enact this
doctrine into statutory form to insure its consideration." 6 Finally, by
specifying in some detail the conduct which will subject a defendant to
jurisdiction, the legislature can assure a greater degree of fairness to the
defendant."'
This writer favors adopting a statute based upon the Wisconsin
provision, which provides for jurisdiction in three situations" 8 and is
relatively specific in format. Enactment of a similar statute would have
several desirable effects in Indiana. Because the conduct giving rise to
jurisdiction is spelled out in detail, the early period in which judicial
boundaries are being set would be minimized. Secondly, by not using the
usual classification of conduct into tort and contract, the statute avoids
any initial question of the character of the act. Thirdly, the statute
presents all the bases for jurisdiction of the state courts in one place, and
separates the jurisdictional act and the giving of notice. This clarifying
move alone commends the statute to Indiana. In addition, this writer
feels the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be enacted into
statute, thus insuring the forum state has sufficient interest in the controversy, vis-A-vis other states, to exercise jurisdiction fairly under the
circumstances.
CONCLUSION

In InternationalShoe the United States Supreme Court opened up
a new area into which state jurisdiction over nonresidents can be
extended, thus giving further protection to residents. Indiana, unlike
115.

This was suggested in Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d. 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).

116. This has been done in Wisconsin. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.19 (Supp. 1967).
117. This is the effect, if not the purpose, of the statutory requirements set forth
in the New York statute and the Model Act when the action is based on a negligent
act out of state causing injury within the state. The method is not limited to this
situation, however.
118. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1967). The three general situations are: 1)
an act by the defendant in the state which affects the plaintiff, 2) an action involving
some degree of consensual privity between the plaintiff and the defendant which
contemplates a substantial contact with the state, and 3) actions out of state causing
injury or damage to property within the state.

952

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

many other states, has not responded with a long arm statute, and its
current laws do not provide comprehensive protection to Indiana residents.
Enactment of a long arm statute would involve some effect on existing
statutes;19 however, there is no reason that presently existing jurisdictional bases could not be retained. While there are many factors to be
considered in drafting a long arm statute, 2 ' the large number of states
possessing them indicates their desirability and workability, and Indiana's
inadequate protection of its residents demonstrates a need for such a
statute.
GregoryA. Hartzler
119. To the extent the method of service of process provided in a new statute
is less cumbersome than the method now provided in certain statutes, the new statute
may supersede the latter in use. Statutes which may be thus superseded include the
nonresident motorist and the nonresident airplane operators statutes (IND. ANN.
STAT. § 47-1043 (Burns 1965 Repl.); IND. ANN. STAT. § 14-907 (Bums 1964 Repl.)).
In addition, if a long arm statute is enacted, there should be a provision to the effect
that IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-606 (Burns 1967 Repl.) (which suspends the Indiana
statute of limitations during the time the defendant is a nonresident of the state) does not
apply to actions which could be brought under the long arm statute. If an action can be
brought in Indiana, there is no reason for the suspension.
120. A list of a number of relevant factors is given in Developments, supra note
2, at 1015. See also, Note, Retroactive Expansion of State Court Jurisdiction Ovcr
Persons,63 COLUM. L. Ray. 1105 (1963).

